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Stephen I. Woods, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
University of North Florida
".. denn es ist wahr, dass jeder Arbeiter im
Kapitalistischen System ein Gastarbeiter ist."
2
In May 1979 the French National Assembly passed legislation giving
the government sweeping powers to expel foreign workers. fet neither
the government nor the employers really want to send most of the immi-
grant workers home, and thereby lose them as a source of cheap labor for
both public and private enterprise. It is likely that the employers
hope to use the new legislation to keep foreign workers in a state of
permanent insecurity, to discourage them from protesting against their
low pay, poor working conditions and the racism they encounter daily.
Indeed, employers would like to see foreign workers treated as a separate
caL._gory of second-class citizens, without the rights of French citizens.
This attempt to divide the workers is a subtle attempt to confuse French
workers into believing that French society is providing charity to sup-
port foreign "intruders" and that this in turn is the cause of the cur-
rent economic crisis. 3
This effort contends that the plight of the "guestworker" can be
applied toward clarifyin the political-economic and social contradic-
tions inherent in crises of "late-capitalism."4 The ratioiale for what
follows lies in the argument that the "problems" of foreign workers in
Western Europe do not remain solely relevant to or caught within a par-
ticular geographical or conceptual frame. A better understanding of the
"guestworker" can conceivably shed light on inter-linked policies of the
extant system of inequalities within which international labor migrations
obtain.
Background
The social history of industrialization is that of mass movements
from country to town; international labor migration is a special case
within this general pattern. While "migration" is in essence a social
process, international labor migrations are in major part a consequence
of unequal economic development.5
Labor migration is a form of development aid given
by the poor countries to the rich countries. Tra-
ditional colonialism took labor (in the form of
slaves) as well as natural resources from the
countries it dominated. Today, neocolonialism ex-
tracts capital from the underdeveloped countries
in various ways, the main one being trade on terms
fixed by the developed countries. The transfer
of human resources in the form of migrant workers
is an important part of this transaction. Migra-
tion belongs to neocolonialism's system for ex-
ploiting the wealth of the Third World.
6
The conditions faced by the migrant represent a reality that is
often harsh: politically he is disenfranchised; socially he is sub-
jected to the most visible and severe forms of xenophobia and economi-
cally he often labors without employment or "survival" security. To
understand the plight of the individual foreign worker, his family and
the sending/receiving nations, is to grasp the migration for employment
phenomenon.
International Labor Migrations
Andre Gorz notes: "There is no country in Western Europe where
international labor is a negligible force, or even a marginal quantity
fluctuating within the economic conjuncture.'7  One cannot grasp the
fact of the growing importance of the immigrant worker in the wage-
earning, working population of every country in Western Europe (and be-
yond) without starting from the position of the immigrant labor force in
the structure of social contradictions and the role given to it by the
historical development of the dominant element in this structure, namely,
capital in its "late phase" of accumulation and internationalization.
Since international labor migrations are essentially a socio-
economic phenomenon (i.e., intake of foreign workers into an economy is
geared to the economic capacity to absorb them), economists generally
explain migrations by the "law" of supply and demand. Within the "free-
trade" paradigm--believed by classical writers to be the best of all
possible worlds--"international movements of capital and labor were re-
garded as largely-a domestic affair." 8  Classical writers did not even
develop a theory of international labor migrations. "It is widely as-
serted," observes Nikolinakos, "that there is no need for a special
theory to explain migrations."
9
This (supply-demand) concept is allied to the
fundamental ideas of classical and neo-classical
economic theory, according to which economic laws
create a harmonious world in which everything
functions in the best possible manner.u
The "best possible manner" is not, however, the net result of
supply and demand at the international level. Myrdal has shown that
it leads to the polarization of development: a "north," toward which
the factors of production move, developes; while a "south," areas out of
which the factors of production move, continues to decline.11 In post-
WWII experience it is obvious that capital is not attracted by the pros-
pects of low wages and high profits alone. It requires, in Nikolinakos'
terms: "security of nure_(political factors) and guaranteed profits(monopoly position)."T .Supply demand theory alone leaves unexplained
the fact that some countries were unable to go through the same develop-
ment process which characterizes labor importers like West Germany,
France and Sweden.
Migration is multi-faceted: (a) it is the movement of a population
within or between countries; (b) it is an individual phenomenon affect-
ing the lives of entire families; (c) it is a class phenomenon involving
the ranking of masses of human beings; (d) it is a structural phenomenon.
The structural importance of alien workers is explained by societal
choices concerning the organization of production (i.e., spatial con-
centration in areas regarded as most profitable).1 A political-economic
consequence of this type of organization is uneven economic development
between sectors and regions. It derives from the clearly stated logic of
capital and the division of labor it commands according to the imperatives
of profit maximization.14 Labor concentration at the national and inter-
national level is determined by the growth of capital. Neither labor
concentration nor uneven development--to the extent there is a different
dynamic attached to the terms--derives from the distribtuion of natural
resources in the world. The countries of emigration are not by definition
"poor in material riches and rich in human resources." They are so be-
cause of relationships of dependence enforced by powerful economic inter-
ests. 15
The structural fit of emigration-immigration is not within the man-
power needs of the economy alone. Immigrations are not purely conjunc-
tural and not as highly sensitive to economic recession as suspected.
One has but to examine the size of the immigrant labor force in the most
productive sectors and its position in the working population as a whole.
Obviously, the less-developed countries of Southern Europe and Northern
Africa represent a superabundant supply of labor--the principal source
of the "reserve army" of labor for the "north." The "north" needs the
"reserve army" because agricultural populations, for example, in West
Germany (7.5%), no longer form an important source of labor. Old people,
women and children also lose some of their significance as reserve.
School leaving age rises, women remain used for cheap child care and
housekeeping and in theory, old people are more certain of recovering
some type of pension. 16
Since the process of replacing labor by capital is expensive in
the short run, and therefore limited, and since a certain percentage
of semiskilled and unskilled workers is also necessary in hi hly
automated firms and other branches of the economy, the import of foreign
workers promises to remain a lasting phenomenon. Actually, one may
pause to appreciate the "genius" of a process which creates a virtually
inexhaustible pool of reserve labor at a physically safe distance from
the industrial cities, across national boundaries.
In 1978 the slums of industrial cities were missing in Sweden and
West Germany. The housing conditions of the best skilled and educated
migrants seemed almost adequate. On the surface, at least, there ap-
peared little crime, little unrest among workers, little unemployment.
Antony Ward, however, describes a discovery which, although not surpris-
ing, is disenchanting.
To find the slums of West Berlin, DUsseldorf (Gothenberg,
Malm6), one must travel south to the impoverished towns
and villages of the Algarve, of Andalusia, Calabria and
Anatalia. Here is the home of West Germany and Sweden's
"reserve army," in conditions of poverty as bad as those
in our traditional Harlems. And the people there, while
they may receive some income from their direct or in-
direct involvement in the industries of the north, enjoy
almost none of the indirect benefits of industrial capi-
talism.17
Well into the 1960's it was taken for granted that the massive out-
flow of workers from the developing countries was beneficial for every-
one. The flexible response of foreign labor to changing demand condi-
tions was regarded as ideal for immigration countries. Emigration was
felt to provide unemployment relief and much needed foreign currency.1 8
The 1967 recession cast costs against the benefits for labor senders
and receivers. Importers like W. Germany and Sweden became aware of
the structural significance and implications of immigration, i.e., the
infrastructural and cultural costs to be met. Doubts were raised with
regard to the relief of unemployment and the purely beneficial nature
of remittances. The policy problem for countries like France became
centered around (a) how to fill extant labor market gaps so that both
micro and macro-economic profitability remained assured without (b) det-
riment to a strained social situation; and, (c) without infringing basic
human rights (the "guestworker" issue was beginning to draw notice in
the international press).
Mobility and "Dirt"
Ulrich Freiherr von Ginanth, chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Labor of the Employers Association (FRG), observes: "The great value
of the employment of foreigners lies in the fact that we have at our
disposal a mobile labor potential. It would be dangerous to limit this
mobility through a large scale assimilation policy." 19
There can be little doubt that the "guests" of industrial society
are afraid to organize. In a sense, the migrant knows he won't be em-
ployed long enough to enjoy long-range victories, pension and health
plans. "If every German in the Federal Republic believes that the mi-
grant worker can be expelled whenever it suits the German convenience,
so too does every migrant."2 0 National labor laws provide for anything
but the feeling of security. While paragraph 120 of the West German
Labor Code gives the migrant the right to social benefits enjoyed by
Germans, paragraph 10 of the same code provides that the worker may be
expelled for lack of self-support (and therefore ineligible for bene-
fits). 2 1
An effect of this mass of unskilled migratory labor has been the
acceleration of the seemingly universal tendency of capitalism to divide
labor into every simpler and mind-separate operations. 22 "Skilled jobs
are divided into simple components which can readily be taught to workers
who have never before stood at the production line. Thus, the sattern
of demand changes towards the skills available or their lack. '"23 This
economic division tends to be reflected in social divisions between the
migrant workers and the native working class.
Castles and Kosack describe the split of the "working class" into
two, highly differentiated segments: the nationals who speak the lan-
guage and enjoy whatever measure of civil rights and social welfare the
society provides. They are well organized into unions which enjoy a
degree of political power and they work in jobs which require some
minimum skill or training, or which are comparatively clean and involve
little physical strain. In contrast, the migrants do the jobs which are
dirty, dangerous and which require physical strength and less skill andtraining.24
It is relatively simple to dwell on migrant workers and dirty jobs.
A great amount of heart-wrenching writing has been published about it;
yet, for the most part, it fails to explain why migrants accept what the
indigenous working class will not. Are migrants naturally submissive?
Is it because of their extreme need?
Castells finds the key to answering these basic questions in the
fact that it is possible to treat the migrant workers as individual wage-
earners whereas the relationship if the indigenous working class with
capital (in labor importers like Sweden nd W. Germany) is established
collectively through the labor movement.5
. . . the utility of imigrant labor to capital
derives primarily from the fact that it can act
toward it as though the labor movement did not
exist, . . .26
One has but to turn to the legal-political status of the foreigners and
their consequent political-ideological isolation to understand the in-
feriority of their position vis a vis capital i.e., their limited
capacity for organization and very great vulnerability to repression.
27
As well, dirty jobs are not surrendered by the working classes in Sweden
or FRG because they are "dirty" but because they are less well paid and
less well attached to benefit packages. When dirty work is well paid,
nationals do it. "Immigrant workers do not exist because there are
arduous and badly paid jobs to be done, but rather, arduous and badly
paid jobs exist because immigrant workers are present or can be sent for
to do them.'2 8
Capital can't do without "arduous jobs" or the migrant to do them
and that is why the migratory mechanism is "designed" to achieve not just
the balance between the supply and demand of labor but the perpetuation
of the dependency relationship between capital and labor--the center and
the periphery. As Nikolinakos observes, it is the internationalization
of labor through the expansion of migration which reflects the inherent
thrust of capital towards securing this relationship. 29 The ingenious
part of this--from the point of view of capital--is that the migrant
worker is pitted not against capital in the struggle to get social se-
curity, for example, but against the national and international state
apparatus of capital in order to meet its demands. Of consequence, the
problem is seen as a welfare state policy issue and not as systemic in
nature.
The poverty of the "south" and the insecurity of the worker must be
seen not as a geographic accident or historical artifact, but as the
continuing effect of an international "system" which simply defines na-
tional borders as anachronistic. The economic forces which now produce
comforts in Stockholm and Stuttgart are simultaneously sustaining the
historical poverty of Cordoba and Messina. Always in motion, the migra-
tion mechanism draws more and more underdeveloping countries into the
system. Antony Ward describes the system as three tiers deep. Black
Africans migrate to the Mediterranean countries so that Mediterranean
workers can be set free for exploitation in the "north.,
'30
One can conclude that international labor migrations are a major
force towards the perpetuation of international imbalance--and they ap-
pear part of a self-feeding system. Second, international labor migra-
tions are supported by an international, institutionalized system of
discrimination anchored in legislation regarding foreigners and in inter-
state agreements. The psychosocial and survival problems of the aging
migrant, for example, can only be understood within the framework of
political economic analysis and this system of institutionally "neces-
sary" discrimination.
The fate of individuals is determined by the laws of accumulation.
(Those "laws" obviously obtain for internal as well as international mi-
grations). To the extent the migratory mechanism is to be humanized it
is only in so far as it will enable capital to ward off political-social
unrest that would appear to endanger the system. "Progress then, may
seem to be made in one or another detail: shorter waiting time for
unemployment benefits; easier access to family aid. Such small steps may
encourage the careless observer to believe that there is definite movement
toward the ultimate goal of equality for migrants. But the situation is
fundamentally bound by powerful interests (priorities and values) which
will prevent the realization of either extreme--full assimilation or full
excl usi on.,"31
Note on the "Equality" Solution
Equality is the overt policy response of nations to the systemic
and systematic discriminations practiced upon migrant workers.
"The language in which it is applauded by the powers
of this world sometimes leave it uncertain which
would horrify them most, the denial of the principle
or the attempt to apply it 32
Equality of opportunity is, of course, a classic capitalist concept.
rhe essential inquiry revolves around what is being equalized. Equal
opportunity can be toward equal oppression; equal treatment can be toward
equal manipulation and regulation; equal rewards can be toward equal
material hardship; equal social participation can be toward powerlessness.
International labor migrations demonstrate clearly that capitalism re-
quires international inequalities as a precondition for its existence.
The intent of equality objectives of migrant worker legislation is
simply a more random distribution of inequalities for nationals and non-
nationals. The message is consistent: if you start from a position of
inequality--among nations and between "foreign" and indigenous labor--you
end up with continued inequality. Equality retains its throne on the
condition that it refrains from meddling with the profitable business of
the factory and the market place. 33
Crisis and Guestworkers
In a certain sense, the "equality" solution to the "problems" of
international labor migrations is symptomatic of the crisis which foreign
workers illuminate. According to Habermas, "crises arise when the
structure of a social system allows for fewer possibilities for problem
solving than are necessary to the continued existence of the system."34
We are experiencing a structural crisis in the allocation of raw
materials and labor power within a world market. This is the source
of international labor migrations and it is the migrant worker--who
experiences the imigration dilemma as critical for his continued exist-
ence, and simultaneously threatens his own social identity--in a title
role of crisis. Unequal allocation of raw materials and labor power--
socially structured and sanctioned inequalities--have evolved as a key
balance mechanism of the historical conditions, social hierarchy, scale
of values, of first world nations. The "equality solution" merely con-
trols any imbalance threat'from the third and fourth worlds.
Most "developed" countries have concerned themselves with justifying
and explaining national and international inequalities in such a way that
the majority of the population (those who by definition are not privi-
leged) accept it as morally right. They have busied themselves with le-
gitimating inequalities. The ideology of equality of treatment (whether
for migrants or not) attempts to cope with an extant social condition
(internationalization of capital and the need for cheap labor) with
justifications derived from the status quo and it shields extant society
against its own alternatives in the sense it denies the historical lim-
itedness of any given social condition. 35
The argument is that international labor migrations are not a con-
junctural phenomenon linked to supply-demand manpower needs of expanding
economies but a structural tendency of "late capitalism." This structural
tendency is explained, in part, by uneven development but primarily by
the internal dynamic of late capitalism. Uneven development explains only
why people emigrate; it does not explain why nations like France and West
Germany provide jobs for migrant workers even in conditions of unemploy-
ment. Neither does it explain why the dominant classes of labor import-
ing nations introduce a social and political element (migrants) whose
presence contradicts their ideology and necessitates more complex mecha-
nisms of social contol. ". . . the extent of immigration and the stra-
tegic role of immigration in the European economy has to be explained,
not in terms of the technical demands of production, but by the specific
interests of capital in a particular phase of its development."36
The central role of the migrant worker is to regulate economic
crises--crises endemic to late capitalism. Capital needs the regulari-
zation of immigration but sees to it that the meeting of real needs is
totally inadequate and fragmented. "It is a policy of control (manipu-
lative compassion) and minor modifications concerning immigration, some-
times paternalistic in the economic sphere, always repressive (dissua-
sive) in the political sphere."37  Immigrants cannot succeed in imposing
a demand of equal rights for that would mean they could no longer play
the role they are assigned by the needs of late capital's low-wage, work-
intensive, "reserve army." Migrant workers confront foreign systems with
claims and intentions that are, in the long run, incompatible with the
extant system's goals. This is a fundamental contradiction.
The essence of this fundamental contradiction is consistent with
Habermas' "crisis:" international labor migrations pose more problems
than the national systems can solve without surrendering elements that
up to that point belonged to their "structural continuity." Solving the
migrant worker problem requires at least momentary and partial surrender
of state nationalism in the granting of rights toward social and economic
security. Nations like France and West Germany have agreed to at least
a portion of these external demands--in the short run--in order to cope
with system maintenance problems. "Equality" is offered to the migrant
as a mechanism to prevent an interruption of the process of accumulation--
an interruption which would take the form of capital destruction.
Historically, the state assumed and remains the compensator for the
dysfunctional consequences of the accumulation process--especially for
those consequences which elicited politically effective reactions. Thus
the state evolved through various stages of compensatory intervention:
granting trade union rights, marginal improvements in wages, working
conditions, health, education and social security. The state replaces
the market to relieve the social and material costs which result from
private production.
For the migrant within this system, the progressive satisfaction of
his needs by the technological mechanism of production and enormous pos..
sibilities of consumption increase his consent to incorporation in this
way of life. "Everyday life" experiences of the migrant reinforce and
internalize the seemingly immutable nature of late capitalist social
order. What confronts the guestworker is not simply a deception but a
specific and socially determined reflection of a mystified reality. The
"reality" says all the fundamental relations between men in the production
process of their material life can be no different.38
iet, the continuous growth of per capita income which has heretofore
legitimated persisting material (and international) inequalities and has
bought the migrant, albeit at low, work-intensive wages, appears no longer
possible because the limits to growth have become visible. The multiple
economic crises of the seventies are intensifying middle-class resistance
to both the presence and equitable treatment of "guest workers." The
system of international labor migrations faces a "legitimation vacuum"--
providing symbols of participation and an illusory equality are not
enough.
If the foreign worker is forced to define his situation in termns of
his power to shape the conditions in which he lives and to change those
conditions according to his needs for "self-actualization," he is bound
to recognize that power is absent. And if migrants define their situation
in terms of their power as social individuals over their collective social
existence they see that capitalist democracy--which offers eqAlity of
treatment--is devoid of content. 39
The establishment of a "social policy" which attempts to lelitimate
inequalities or to make-up quantitatively what is lost qualita~i\V o
toward counter-effectiveness. "It is not that the pressures A# wnt haYe
been eliminated--far from it--but rather that these have been UPPI 
nt A
by a discontent which cannot be touched by providing more pros' i t
y and
jobs because these are the very things that produced this dis"'141 ifl
the first place." 40  Essentially, the international state--in 1't
the national state--cannot provide stronger legitimations for
worker's lack of autonomy and security as long as it leaves iV' W' { '
capital infrastructure and its priorities: the "generators o" '
ities."
The market system breaks down. Its collapse is in its i!"'
put together human beings, capital and land in order to produ ,"
factory level of output for' the world. At the international
real issue may be how long the "international state" and the national
state can remain compatible with the needs and purposes of capital.
That question is buried deep beneath the celebration
of Western democracy, the free world, the welfare state,
the affluent society, the end of ideology and plural-
istic equilibrium. To have posed it even a few years
ago would have appeared ludicrous or perverse.4 1
The response is demographic, social, political and psychological. The
response to crisis is a "multiplicity of cooperating remedies." Nothing
short of everything is really enough. 42 Implied is the move beyond the
social system which no longer offers possibilities of problem solving.
New choices based on different values must be confronted.
We can make different social choices concerning the allocation of
natural resources, the social division of labor and the distribution of
rights for a world commonwealth.4 3 The crises tell us it is time to
choose again, that we are not caught in the immutable downflow of events
over which we have no control. The basis for our new choices requires,
however, the right political motivation.
And the basis for that political motivation should be
that not only do we share a common origin, but, in-
escapably, we share the same destiny. It is a destiny
that the human race is now capable of choosing.44
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